

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

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# Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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Vietnam: President Thieu has taken the announcement of the Communists' "Provisional Revolutionary Government" (PRG) in stride.

He quickly dismissed it as another Communist ploy aimed at destroying his government. Thieu pointed out that the leaders of the PRG are all "familiar faces" from the Communist camp. He said that the new Communist creation would not affect the talks in Paris, because they would remain two-sided as before.

Analysis of the PRG's composition supports Thieu's statements. The chairmanship and first-level posts of the PRG are all allotted to hard-core Communists. Only at the subministerial level does the PRG begin to broaden to include some fellow travelers.

Moreover, the make-up of the PRG suggests that the Communists discarded any hopes of creating a rival government which would include at least some persons with genuine appeal to non-Communist nationalists. Most PRG figures are completely recognizable to politically aware Vietnamese as long-time Communists or fellow travelers.

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Some sharp fighting occurred in the northern provinces of South Vietnam on 11 June. Enemy sappers penetrated a US artillery base south of Da Nang, and more than a dozen US soldiers were killed before the Communists were driven off. Closer to Da Nang, an enemy battalion left 35 dead in the wake of an attack on a US Marine command post.

The Communists may be planning another surge of widespread attacks during the period beginning on 15 June.

Prisoners and documents captured recently also point to enemy plans for terrorist attacks and political agitation in the major cities, including Saigon.

(Map)

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25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 International Communism: Dissident parties continue to use their speeches at the world conference to challenge the Soviet position on sensitive issues.

In his speech yesterday the Italian party representative directly criticized the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and said his delegation was not willing to sign the conference document in its present form. He was critical, too, of anti-Chinese pronouncements on the conference floor and urged the need for China's support in the struggle against imperialism.

The Czechoslovaks and, of course, the Soviets had hoped to avoid the invasion issue. Party chief Husak, in a speech later yesterday, rebuked the Italians, as well as the Australians who last week condemned the invasion.

By comparison with the Italians, the Rumanian speech on 9 June was more guarded in tone. Ceausescu cited several negative aspects of the conference, in particular expressing disapproval of attacks on the Chinese leadership. Ceausescu insisted on every party's right to dissent and to be independent. He hinted that he might not be able to sign the final document, but said that Rumania had decided to remain at the conference.

The French party adhered closely to the Soviet line in its formal speech. A spokesman tried to salvage some credit for the party, however, by informing Western press representatives that it still did not approve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Many delegations reportedly are critical of the haphazard methods of the conference. Much work still has to be done on the wording of the basic document, and no decision has yet been reached as to whether delegations must approve the document in toto or will be allowed to approve only sections of it. Four commissions reportedly have been designated to work on the document. Objections would become stronger if Moscow tried to add to the document language condemning China.

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Communist China: Peking's most authoritative pronouncement on domestic affairs since the ninth party congress constitutes a strong warning to recalcitrant elements to fall in line.

On 8 June, Peking broadcast a joint editorial by the three major party and military journals which strongly reaffirmed the current drive to restore political unity after the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. New instructions attributed to Mao Tsetung were added to key themes of the last two months, all of them stressing that it is imperative to unite the vast majority--"95 percent"--of the people behind Peking's policies.

Most pointedly, the editorial insisted that reeducated and "liberated" cadres--even some who had earlier opposed Mao himself--must be restored to positions of real authority. Many of these men--purged by Red Guard action--are experienced managers and administrators. The language of the editorial reflects the influence in Peking of those elements in China's leadership with the greatest interest in order and national development--primarily the central and regional military leaders, together with senior government administrators.

The editorial itself, however, makes clear that strong opposition to this coalition of forces remains. Radical elements in the leadership who were most active in purging some of these rehabilitated officials are resisting this restoration policy.

The radical viewpoint is heard occasionally, despite Peking's massive propaganda on the unity theme. An editorial of 23 May in a Shanghai paper frequently used as a radical voice during the Cultural Revolution warned against the indiscriminate return of such cadres to their old posts. Tsingtao radio on 31 May, in the first such instance in a year, went a step further by extolling the Red Guards' earlier revolutionary performance.

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The appearance of the authoritative editorial suggests that the order-oriented group in the leadership is strong enough to put the radicals on notice that attempts to obstruct the process of political rehabilitation or to challenge the authority of pro-	
vincial authorities will not be tolerated.	25X <sup>2</sup>

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Argentina: President Ongania has begun the reorganization of his administration by upgrading the Secretariat of Education to a ministry to deal with student unrest, and by naming new ministers of economy and interior.

The former economy minister had achieved significant progress with his program, but had also become the chief target of labor dissatisfaction. Press reports indicate that he recommended his successor, Jose Maria Dagnino Pastore, a young Harvard-trained economist currently serving as head of the National Development Council. Dagnino Pastore places somewhat greater emphasis on development than his predecessor, but his policies, at least initially, will probably not be radically different.

The new interior minister is retired General
Francisco Imaz, formerly governor of Buenos Aires
Province, whose nationalist orientation is also
similar to that of his predecessor.

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 $\frac{\text{Ecuador}}{\text{into}}$ : President Velasco is getting deeper

Vice President Zavala has now charged that Velasco plans to assume dictatorial powers. The controversial and unpopular Zavala is hardly the rallying point for Velasco's opposition, but his suspicions that the President views himself as above the law are widely shared. Zavala's Radical Liberal Party has recently begun criticizing Velasco after a year of legislative cooperation.

Public confidence in Velasco has weakened noticeably in recent weeks. Fiscal problems and frequent cabinet and administrative changes have impeded government operations, while the administration has been erratic in efforts to control students who for weeks have disrupted key Ecuadorean cities. Military leaders may indeed have warned the President that they must be given more power to assure public order.

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
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Afghanistan: The government continues to sidestep any action to remedy the causes underlying the current wave of student discontent.

On 9 June, the government closed all schools in Kabul for an indefinite time because of the steadily growing, though basically nonviolent, student demonstrations that have occurred since mid-April. Instead of attempting to redress student and faculty grievances, the government has thus postponed decisions regarding academic policies and the amount of force to be used in dealing with student activism.

Cabinet members will probably become even more reluctant to take any decisive action as the parliamentary elections, commencing in August, draw closer, and the uneasy student situation may be allowed to drift throughout the summer. The government presumably anticipates a decline in the number of demonstrations as students leave Kabul to return to their homes in the provinces. If, however, the remaining students, encouraged by the extreme right and left, continue to demonstrate, the government may be forced to use stern tactics—perhaps even calling in the army—to maintain order.

Despite the present difficulties and the lack of governmental leadership, King Zahir appears to remain firmly in power. He will probably encourage the politicians to take whatever steps are necessary to maintain order, lest the current unrest provide an excuse for leaders at both ends of the political spectrum to attack his halting, but mildly masuccessful, six-year-old "experiment in democracy."



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
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Senegal: In the face of growing labor unrest, President Senghor has declared a state of emergency.

Senghor's action came after the national labor union had called a 48-hour general strike to begin today. By last night, the police took over the labor union headquarters. The general strike call followed a breakdown in talks between striking bank workers and their employers. Union leaders, who had previously been able to restrain the increasingly militant rank and file from backing the bank workers, have now apparently been forced to go along.

This latest unrest comes against a background of widespread student disaffection, which has erupted in strikes and riots on several occasions over the past year. The disaffected students will probably make common cause with the workers and seek to prolong the strike.

Senghor recently condemned the bank strikes as unreasonable and contrary to national interests. Despite the general hardening of the government's attitude toward the workers, Senghor may yet try to negotiate with them. Serious budgetary difficulties, however, will probably prevent him from satisfying the basic demands of the labor unions which are likely to remain a continuing source of



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25X1 NOTES Czechoslovakia: The Husak leadership is planning to reorganize the Foreign Ministry and to reshuffle personnel extensively in diplomatic posts abroad. Various diplomats who were most outspoken in opposing the Soviet invasion and its aftermath-including as many as 20 ambassadors in Western countries--reportedly will be recalled and retired. Conservatives who were exiled to diplomatic posts probably also will come home to re-enter party and government posts. The reorganization may be complicated, however, by Slovak demands for better representation in a federalized foreign service; there is a shortage of competent Slovak officials to fill posts vacated by the Czechs. 25X1 Brazil: Security officials are continuing their efforts to prevent student demonstrations during Governor Rockefeller's visit. At the University of Brasilia they have rounded up 19 of 22 leaders of the outlawed student federation, and students are expecting further repressive measures. At the University of Sao Paulo, the growing number of preventive arrests is reported to be angering even moderate students, who associate the US with this "repression." Extremist students may be able to exploit this attitude to gain the support of the moderates for 25X1 anti-Rockefeller demonstrations. 25> 25X1 Panama: / Figurehead President Jose Pinilla suffered a severe heart attack on 10 June. The 52-yearold Pinilla's condition appears serious because of his prior history of cardiac attacks. Pinilla and his deputy Bolivar Urrutia--both former national guard colonels--have made up the combination that nominally functions as the executive. The real power in the country, however, is exercised by guard commandant General Torrijos and is not likely to be affected by Pinilla's illness or death. 25X1 25X1 (continued) 12 Jun 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin

Turkey: Student unrest, allegedly over the slow pace of educational reform, has led to new violence in Ankara and Istanbul. Violence by student extremists in Ankara included a hit-and-run attack yesterday on the US military headquarters building. Molotov cocktails were thrown, but damage was not extensive. A battle between riot police and students in Istanbul on 10 June left many injured, some seriously. Politically motivated extremists continue to play on the students' frustration, and sporadic attacks on the symbols of the US presence in Turkey can be expected.

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